The 1999 East Timor Crisis marked a sharp reversal in the conduct of the United States toward Indonesia: after years of decisive military and diplomatic support for Indonesian rule, Washington pressed the generals to withdraw and allow peacekeepers into East Timor. In Noam Chomsky’s account, that last-minute intervention both helped stop the immediate violence and exposed how much earlier the United States could have done to prevent it.

Background and International Support

The crisis followed roughly twenty-five years of violence in East Timor. The United States and Britain continued supporting Indonesia, whose actions had already eliminated about one-third of the population, according to the account. Chomsky describes that assistance as decisive and says it continued through the 1999 massacres.

The scale of the violence intensified around the events of early September. Thousands had been killed before the fighting at the beginning of the month drove 85 percent of the population from their homes and destroyed 70 percent of the country. The Indonesian military had repeatedly insisted it would not leave East Timor. It also presented itself as defending Indonesian West Timor against a possible intervention force, while using aircraft that Britain continued to supply.

Pressure and the Reversal

By September 8, 1999, the worst atrocities were known. Bill Clinton faced substantial pressure to act, especially from Australia, as well as from Americans. A few days later, his administration told the Indonesian generals that the situation was over. The generals promptly reversed course: they announced a withdrawal and permitted United Nations peacekeepers, led by Australians, to enter East Timor without opposition from the Indonesian army.

The speed of that change is central to Chomsky’s interpretation. The military’s prior declarations of resolve gave way after a message from Clinton; its resistance to an international force did not hold. In the author’s account, this turn demonstrated Washington’s continuing, largely concealed power over events and its capacity to influence the Indonesian military’s choices.

Consequences and Historical Significance

The withdrawal and the entry of peacekeepers came after the mass displacement and destruction had already occurred. Chomsky argues that the same influence could have been used to prevent much of the preceding twenty-five years of violence, rather than being applied only at the crisis’s late stage. He attributes primary responsibility for the long record of crimes to the policies of successive American administrations, alongside Britain and other supporters of Indonesia.

The consequences, as presented in the account, did not end with the withdrawal. Violence continued in impoverished refugee camps in Indonesian West Timor. The crisis therefore has two linked endings: the Indonesian army’s sudden acceptance of withdrawal and peacekeepers, and the continuing hardship of displaced people beyond East Timor. Chomsky contrasts this history with the later presentation of Western governments as newly committed to humanitarian intervention, arguing that the record of prior support complicates that claim.